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Abstract
We conduct an experiment to understand the principles that govern network for-
mation. The design of the experiment builds on a model of linking and efforts taken
from Galeotti and Goyal [2010]. In order to reduce cognitive complexity facing human
subjects and facilitate learning, we develop a new experimental platform that inte-
grates a network visualization tool using an algorithm of Barnes and Hut [1986] with
an interactive tool of asynchronous choices in continuous time.
Our experiment provides strong support for macroscopic predictions of the theory:
there is specialization in linking and efforts across all treatments. Moreover, and in line
with the theory, the specialization is more pronounced in larger groups. Thus subjects
abide by the law of the few.
Information on payoffs provided to subjects affects their behavior and yields differ-
ential welfare consequences. In the treatment where subjects see only their own payoffs,
in large groups, the most connected individuals compete fiercely—they exert large ef-
forts and have small earnings. By contrast, when a subject sees everyone’s payoffs, in
large groups, the most connected individuals engage in less intense competition—they
exert little effort and have large earnings. The effects of information are much more
muted in small groups.
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1 Introduction
Large scale social networks are a defining feature of contemporary society. Empirical re-
search suggests that such networks exhibit a law of the few: effort provision is concentrated
in a very small subset of individuals and the distribution of links is also very unequal.1
Given the prominence of these networks, it is important to understand the principles un-
derlying their formation.
As efforts and links are costly, individuals would naturally compare the trade-offs. So
our starting point is the economic theory of network formation.2 Galeotti and Goyal [2010]
present a model with costly efforts and linking. Linking with another individual gives
access to that individual’s efforts and also the efforts of his neighbours. They show that
every robust equilibrium of their game exhibits the law of the few. This model has been
tested in the laboratory with small groups of subjects. The results are very mixed. For
instance, in an interesting recent paper, van Leeuwen et al. [2018] find that the hub-spoke
structure predicted by the theory does not arise in the laboratory. These experimental
findings raise a question mark about the validity of the economic mechanisms underlying
the model.
A common element of existing network formation experiments is that the number of
subjects is small, typically ranging between 4 and 8. Moreover, most of the experiments
require subjects to make simultaneous choices in discrete time. In a real world setting,
groups are very large and individuals typically choose effort and linking at different points
in time. The individual decision problem is complicated because the attractiveness of
links depends on the efforts of individuals and also on the efforts by the neighbours of
these individuals. As group size grows, these informational requirements become more
demanding. So it is quite unclear if we can extend the findings from the small group
experiments to more realistic settings. The work of Friedman and Aprea [2012] suggests
that continuous time experiments offer subjects more opportunities to learn on how to
make decisions and that they may offer better prospects for convergence than discrete time
experiments. Our paper builds on this insight.
A large-scale continuous-time experiment on network formation generates a great deal
of information that is in principle relevant for decision making. This may be cognitively too
1See, for example, Baraba´si and Albert [1999], Goyal et al. [2006], and Jackson and Rogers [2007].
2For early contributions see Bala and Goyal [2000] and Jackson and Wolinsky [1996]. For a survey, see
Bramoulle and Rogers [2016].
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demanding for individuals and can undermine the rationale for controlled experimentation.
In order to handle such concerns, we develop a new experimental platform. Three aspects
of the platform are worth noting. Firstly, it includes a network visualization tool that
uses the Barnes-Hut approximation algorithm (Barnes and Hut [1986]). This algorithm
allocates nodes and edges in a two-dimensional space to improve visual clarity of network
presentation. Secondly, we integrate this tool for network visualization with the interac-
tive tool of dynamic choices. This feature allows individuals to form and remove links and
change effort levels instantly. The integration enables us to update rapidly evolving net-
works in real time on the computer screen. Finally, the platform is flexible in information
provision both with regard to what subjects know about the network and what they know
about the actions and payoffs of different subjects.
We consider four group sizes 4, 8, 50, 100 and each of these groups plays the linking and
effort game over 6 minutes. There are two information treatments: in the baseline treat-
ment, subjects observe only their own payoffs, while in the payoff information treatment a
subject observes the payoffs of everyone. Taken together, we therefore have a 4× 2 design.
This design enables us to vary the strategic uncertainty and cognitive complexity facing
subjects and therefore offers us a natural way to test the theory.
We start with the baseline information treatment. To get an overall impression of
the dynamics of linking and effort, Figures 1 and 2 present snap shots taken from the
experiment with a hundred subjects. Initially, at minute 1, subject P26 emerges as a hub
with the maximum effort 20. There are other subjects who make maximal effort (such as
P97). At minute 3, P26 continues to be a hub but has substantially lowered her effort. Due
to this shading of effort, she starts to lose some of her links to subject P97, who has kept
her effort at 20. The transition becomes clearer in Figure 2a at the 5 minute mark, when
the initial hub subject P26 has lost most of her links to the emerging hub P97. Figure 2b
confirms that this transition is stable until the end of the game. These figures highlight two
macroscopic patterns: there is specialization in linking and efforts and there is a positive
correlation between links and efforts. The figures also bring out individual level dynamics:
a few individuals exert large efforts and this leads to intense competition to become a hub.
This rivalry leads to the emergence of a “pure influencer” outcome. We now examine the
data from the experiments more systematically.
Our first set of findings concern the macroscopic patterns. In all four group sizes, there
is a tendency toward specialization in linking and efforts, but this tendency expresses itself
in the clearest form in the large groups (especially in the hundred subject treatment).
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(a) At minute 1
(b) at minute 3
Figure 1: Snap shots of a dynamic game
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(a) At minute 5
(b) At minute 6
Figure 2: Snap shots of a dynamic game (cont.)
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Another finding is that, across all group sizes, there is a positive correlation between
connectedness and effort: this supports the pure influencer outcome.
Our second set of findings are about the individual behavior that supports these macro-
scopic patterns. In all four group sizes, highly connected individuals exert large efforts.
However, the level of efforts and the closeness of the efforts between the few most con-
nected individuals varies with group size. In particular, in small groups the efforts of the
most connected individual are close to the equilibrium prediction of the static model. By
contrast, in the large groups of fifty and a hundred subjects, the most connected subject
chose efforts that are excessive and much above the equilibrium prediction. Moreover, in
small groups the efforts of the most connected and the second most connected individual
are far apart, while they are fairly similar in the large groups. This suggests that a larger
group size intensifies the level of competition.
So the big effect of group size is on efforts and competition dynamics: why do individuals
seek to become hubs? The natural motivation would be a desire to increase payoffs. To
our surprise, we find that individuals who seek to become the hub by making large efforts
(and by forming multiple links) typically have low earnings. Indeed, in many cases they
earn much less than the peripheral players. This poses a puzzle.
Could it be that subjects fail to understand the payoff implications of large efforts and
linking? We explore this idea by considering another setting of the experiment in which
subjects are shown the payoffs of everyone. Provision of payoff information on everyone
can facilitate a comparison of payoff performances among subjects, which in turn makes it
easy for subjects to understand the payoff implications of their own choices. Availability
of such information may also alter dynamic adjustments of individual behavior due to
different sources such as imitation and sophistication (Schlag [1998], Huck et al. [1999],
and Camerer [2003]).
Providing subjects with information on everyone’s payoffs has large effects. To get a
first impression of these effects, Figures 3 and 4 present snap shots taken in the payoff
information treatment with a hundred subjects. Observe that the specialization in linking
continues to hold in this setting. However, there is a major change in the behavior of
individuals seeking to become a hub: the most connected individual (P23) starts at a high
effort 14, but then shades her efforts. The key difference with the baseline is that the
challengers do not respond by making excessive efforts. As a result, the efforts by the most
connected individual keep declining (and the number of links formed by her is also close
to zero). This has two important implications. The outcome is closer to a “pure connector
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outcome” in some groups and, in most groups, the most connected individual earns much
more than the peripheral individuals.
We now summarize the general findings of the payoff information treatment. Our first
observation is that even with payoff information, in all four group sizes, there is a tendency
toward specialization in linking and in efforts, and that this tendency is stronger in the large
groups. This finding taken together with the findings of the baseline treatment suggests
that subjects abide by the law of the few.
The second observation is that in the payoff information treatment, in small groups
there is a strong positive correlation while in large groups there is a weak correlation
between connectedness and effort. In some large groups the most connected individual
puts in 0 effort and this leads to the pure connector outcome (as in Figures 3 and 4), while
in others there emerges the pure influencer outcome. The selection of the pure connector
outcome is the major departure from what we observed in the baseline treatment. This
motivates a closer examination of the individual level behavior in the two information
treatments.
We find that, in the payoff information treatment, across the four group sizes, the efforts
of the most connected individual tend to be close to the equilibrium prediction in the small
groups but are substantially lower in the large groups. A comparison between the baseline
and payoff information treatment reveals that payoff information interacts with group size
in shaping behavior. We are led to the view that, under the baseline treatment, in large
groups, cognitive constraints may be driving the excessive efforts and the high linking of the
most connected individuals. When highly connected individuals are shown information on
everyone’s payoffs, this cognitive constraint is relaxed and individuals appear to understand
the adverse payoff implications of excessive efforts. This discourages a challenger from
making high efforts in large groups. Interestingly, as a consequence, in large groups, it
allows an incumbent hub to lower efforts greatly and obtain much higher payoffs. This
suggests that, with payoff information, a larger group size reinforces incumbency power
and reduces competition.
We now place our paper in the context of the experimental literature on network for-
mation. Prominent early papers include Callander and Plott [2005], Goeree et al. [2009],
Falk and Kosfeld [2012]; recent papers include Rong and Houser [2012], van Leeuwen et al.
[2018] and Goyal et al. [2017]. The principal novelty of our paper is that we study network
formation in large groups of up to 100 subjects. This necessitates a methodological change
in the way we assess the experimental evidence: existing papers have focussed on exact
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(a) At minute 1
(b) at minute 3
Figure 3: Snap shots with payoff information
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(a) At minute 5
(b) At minute 6
Figure 4: Snap shots with payoff information (cont.)
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predictions of the theory: e.g., the emergence of star network. By contrast, we take a
statistical approach and study the distributions of degree and effort. This builds a bridge
between the strategic models of network formation and the large body of work on complex
and large networks. Existing papers use small groups and find mixed evidence in support
of the structural predictions of the theory, see e.g. Berninghaus et al. [2006], Falk and
Kosfeld [2012], Goeree et al. [2009] and van Leeuwen et al. [2018]. By contrast, we find
that, under a variety of circumstances, in small and large groups, with and without payoff
information, there is a strong tendency toward specialization in linking and efforts. This
specialization becomes progressively more acute in the large groups. Thus our experiments
suggest that subjects abide by the law of the few.3
Our paper also contributes to the experimental literature of continuous time games.
Existing studies are built on a recent development of experimental software, called ConG,
allowing economic experiments in continuous time (Pettit et al. [2014]) and have focused on
small group interaction (see e.g., Friedman and Aprea [2012]; Calford and Oprea [2017]).
The novelty of our paper is that we develop an experimental software that enables us to
study large group interaction in continuous time. In order to overcome information overload
of evolving networks and relax subjects’ cognitive bounds in information processing, our
software integrates the network visualization tool with the interactive tool of asynchronous
choices in real time. This is achieved by adopting an enhanced communication protocol
between the server and subjects’ computers. It allows us to run both network visualization
and asynchronous dynamic choices in real time without communication congestion and
lagged responses, even when participants are interacting remotely from different physical
locations. Due to these technical advances for large-scale continuous time experiments, we
are able to document empirical findings that are especially relevant for large groups such
as the law of the few and the interaction between group size and payoff information.
2 Theory
We present a model of linking and efforts taken from Galeotti and Goyal [2010].
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with n ≥ 3. Each player i ∈ N simultaneously and independently
chooses a level of information acquisition xi ∈ X and a set of links gi with others to access
3There is a also a small literature on experiments in which players choose partners and then play a
coordination game, see e.g., Riedl et al. [2016], Kearns et al. [2012]. The focus here is on how linking shapes
behavior in the coordination game. This is quite different from the motivation of the current paper.
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their information such that gi = (gi1, . . . , gii−1, gii+1, . . . , gin), and gij ∈ {0, 1} for any
j ∈ N\{i}. Let Gi = {0, 1}n−1. We define the set of strategies of player i as Si = X ×Gi,
and the set of strategies for all players as S = S1 × . . . × Sn. A strategy profile s =
(x, g) specifies efforts by each player, s = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), and the network links made by
every player, g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn). The network g is a directed graph. The closure of g
is an undirected network denoted by g¯ where g¯ij = max(gij , gji) for every i, j ∈ N . The
undirected link between two players reflects bilateral information exchange between them.
We define ηi(g) = |{j ∈ N : gij = 1}| as the number of links i has formed. For any pair of
players i and j in g, the geodesic distance, denoted by d(i, j; g¯), is the length of the shortest
path between i and j in g¯. If no such path exists, the distance is set to infinity. We define
N li (g¯) = {j ∈ N : d(i, j; g¯) = l} as the set of players at distance l from i in g¯.
Given a strategy profile s = (x, g), the payoffs of player i are:
Πi(x, g) = f(xi +
n−1∑
l=1
al(
∑
j∈N li (g¯)
xj))− cxi − ηi(g)k (1)
where c denotes the constant marginal cost of efforts, k the cost of linking with another
player, and al reflects the spillover across players who are at distance l. So if j ∈ N li (g¯),
then the value of agent j’s information to i is given by alxj . We assume that al ≥ al+1, for
all l ∈ {1, .., n−2}. In the paper, we will focus on the special case where a1 = 1, a2 ∈ (0, 1),
and al = 0, for all l ≥ 3. The benefit function f(y) is twice continuously differentiable,
increasing, and strictly concave in y. For simplicity, also assume that f(0) = 0, f ′(0) > c,
and limy→∞ f ′(y) = m < c. Under these assumptions there exists a number yˆ ∈ X such
that f ′(yˆ) = c.
There are no general equilibrium characterization results available for this model; the
analysis of Galeotti and Goyal [2010] focuses on polar cases in which a1 = 1 and al = 0,
for all l ≥ 2 and the case where al = 1, for all l. Here we are allowing for gradual decay
in valuation with distance in network; a case which appears to be the natural one. The
following result characterizes equilibrium when linking costs are relatively large.
Proposition 1. Suppose payoffs are given by (1), a1 = 1, and a2 ∈ (0, 1). Then there
exists a kˆ, such that for k ∈ (kˆ, cyˆ) the following is true. The equilibrium network is a
periphery sponsored star. There exist two possible effort equilibrium configurations:
• the pure influencer outcome: the hub invests yˆ and everyone else invests 0.
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• the pure connector outcome: the hub invests 0 and everyone else invests yˆ1+(n−2)a2 .
The proof is presented here for easy reference.
Proof. The first step is to observe that in equilibrium every individual must access at least
yˆ. This is true because if someone is accessing less than yˆ, then due to the concavity of the
f(.) function, she can simply increase her utility by raising effort so that the total access
equals yˆ.
The second step is to show that players will form one link or zero link, for sufficiently
large linking costs. Observe that an isolated individual will choose yˆ. So it follows that in
a network with connections, no one will ever choose more than yˆ. Note that if link costs
are close to cyˆ then it is not profitable to form links with two individuals who each choose
yˆ. So the only situation in which an individual, A, may choose two or more links arises if
an individual accesses significantly more than yˆ through each link. Consider a link between
A and B. Iterating on optimal effort, it is true that if B chooses yˆ then every neighbor
of B must choose 0. So A accesses more than yˆ only if B chooses strictly less than yˆ. If
a neighbour of B chooses a positive effort then it must be the case then this person must
meet the first order condition on optimal efforts: her total efforts invested and accessed
must equal yˆ. As this person is a neighbour of B, it follows that A cannot access more
than yˆ via the link with B. So, A will form at most one link in equilibrium.
The third step considers effort configurations. Take the situation in which some indi-
vidual (say) A chooses yˆ. It is optimal for everyone else to choose effort 0 and form a link
with this person. And it is clearly optimal for A to choose yˆ faced with zero efforts by
everyone else.
To conclude the proof, we need to show that the pure connector outcome is the only
possible equilibrium in a situation where no player chooses yˆ. Observe first that the pure
connector outcome is an equilibrium so long as k < c yˆ(n−2)a21+(n−2)a2 . Observe that c
yˆ(n−2)a2
1+(n−2)a2
converges to cyˆ, as n gets large.
Now we rule out any other possible equilibrium. The key step here is to show that any
equilibrium network must have diameter less than or equal to 2. Suppose the diameter of
a component is 3 or more. We know from step 2 that the component must be acyclic. So
consider two furthest apart leaf nodes. A variant of the ‘switching’ argument, developed
in Bala and Goyal [2000], shows that one of the two leaf players have a strict incentive to
deviate. So every component must have diameter 2. Given that the network is acyclic, this
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implies it must be a star. It is now possible to apply standard agglomeration arguments
to deduce that multiple components cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Finally, the hub player must choose zero. Suppose not. By hypothesis the hub chooses
less than yˆ. Given that a1 and a2 < 1, both the hub and the spokes cannot be accessing
exactly yˆ. A contradiction that implies that the hub must choose zero effort.
In the pure influencer equilibrium, we witness an extreme version of the ‘law of the few’:
a single person receives all the links formed in society and also carries out all the efforts.
The pure connector equilibrium retains the specialization in links: a single person receives
all links. However, now the efforts are fairly evenly spread out. Interestingly, in both
equilibria the creation of links is basically egalitarian – n − 1 players form one link each.
For large k values, the payoff distribution is only slightly unequal in the pure influencer
equilibrium. However, the pay-off inequality can be very large in the pure connector
equilibrium (especially if k is large and a2 is small). We note that the pure connector
equilibrium holds only for a sufficiently large group size n, i.e., n ≥ 2 + ka2(cyˆ−k) .
We now present the specific function f(.) used in the experiment and the rest of the
numerical details.
f(y) =
y(29− y) if y ≤ 14196 + y else (2)
In the experiment we assume that efforts are integers and set a maximum bound,
x = 20. So the efforts set is given by X = [0, 20]. And we will assume that c = 11 and
k = 95 and a2 = 1/2. In this context, it can be checked that yˆ = 9. There exists a
pure influencer equilibrium in which a single individual chooses 9 and all other individuals
choose 0 and form a link with the positive effort player. In principle, there exists a pure
connector equilibrium in which the periphery players each choose 18/n, for any n ≥ 50.4
In our experiment, however, given the integer constraints, this equilibrium is no longer
feasible (for any n ≥ 50, 0 < 18/n < 1 is not an integer). In this context, in the treatments
with 50 and 100 subjects, the periphery sponsored star where 18 peripheral individuals
choose 1 and the rest of the subjects choose 0 constitutes an ‘approximate’ equilibrium (for
4The pure connector equilibrium does not hold in the experimental setting for any n < 50.
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Figure 5: Pure influencer and pure connector equilibrium, n = 50
details see Online Appendix A).5 Figure 5 illustrates the pure influencer equilibrium and
the pure connector approximate-equilibrium.
To summarize, in the pure influencer equilibrium, the hub chooses effort 9, while the
spokes choose 0. The spokes form one link with the hub. The hub earns 81, while the spokes
earn 85. In the pure connector equilibrium, the hub chooses effort 0, eighteen spokes choose
1 each, while the other spokes choose 0. The hub earns 198, the active spokes 74, and the
inactive spokes 85.
3 Experiment
3.1 Challenges and methodology
The goal of this paper is to understand the mechanisms that shape network formation and
assorted activity in large groups. As the complexity of subjects’ decision making increases
in scale, large-scale experiments on network formation pose several major challenges. We
discuss these challenges and explain how our experimental software and design address
each of them.
5The periphery player who chooses effort 1 and forms a link with the hub earns 79.25. This person could
earn 81 by deleting the link and instead choosing effort level 9.
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(a) Fixed visualization (b) Adaptive visualization
Figure 6: Examples of network visualization
Network visualization. Existing studies of network formation in economics have con-
sidered small group sizes such as 4 or 8 people in a group and visualized evolving networks
with fixed positions of nodes (e.g., Goyal et al. [2017]; van Leeuwen et al. [2018]). When
the group size increases, such a representation of networks with fixed positions of nodes
makes it very difficult for subjects to perceive network features adequately. For example,
consider a group of 20 people with fixed positions of nodes in a circle as depicted in Figure
6a. While the exact nature of the network is hardly perceptible by observing Figure 6a,
the same network structure can be represented in a transparent manner in Figure 6b.
For subjects to learn what to do, they must have a good idea of the evolving networks.
An appropriate tool for visualizing networks is thus critical in running the experiment in
continuous time. This leads us to develop an experimental software including an interactive
network visualization tool that allows the network to automatically reshape itself based on
its evolving structure. We use the Barnes-Hut approximation algorithm [Barnes and Hut,
1986] for grouping nodes in a network that are sufficiently nearby and adjust their relative
positions on the subject’s computer screen. It enables us to apply repulsion forces between
nodes so that they are sufficiently separated from one another, attractive forces to nodes
that are directly linked with each other, and gravity to all the nodes with respect to a central
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origin on the screen such that nodes not linked with each other remain within reasonable
distance from each other. The network visualization in Figure 6b was made using this
algorithm. In our large-scale experiment, this visualization tool improves graphical clarity
of evolving networks and helps subjects distinguish between those who are more connected
and those who are less connected. More details regarding the specifics of this visualization
tool (including model parameters characterizing attraction and repulsion forces) can be
found in Online Appendix B. It is important to emphasize that this tool allows interaction
between the subject and the network: while the nodes are subject to the above attraction
and repulsion forces, they can also be freely manipulated by the participant through the
usual drag-select functionality. The creation and removal of links is also interactive through
double-clicking on corresponding nodes. This network visualization tool is built on the open
source Javascript library vis.js.
Learning and dynamics. We wish to allow subjects ample opportunities to learn about
the environment of decision making, other subjects’ behaviors, and how to respond opti-
mally to them. In view of the strategic complexity alluded to above, the issue of learning
and behavioral convergence is particularly complicated. To address these issues, and to
make the learning opportunities as comparable across group sizes as possible, we run the
experiment in continuous time with near real time updating—of all actions and linking by
everyone—for every subject.6 Continuous time experiments can also offer better prospects
for convergence than discrete time experiments (see e.g., Friedman and Aprea [2012]).
In our experiment, the game is played in continuous time for 6 minutes during which
every subject was free to asynchronously adjust their actions of efforts and linking. Because
subjects face a complex problem of decision making and need some time to figure out the
game and coordinate their actions, a trial time of one minute is provided (during which
subjects start choosing their actions with no monetary consequence). After the trial period
is over, the subsequent 5 minutes are payoff relevant and one second is randomly chosen to
determine subjects’ earnings in the game. This information is publicly known to subjects.
Running the continuous time experiments in large groups poses some technical chal-
lenges. First, every action made by a subject on her computer must be updated instantly
on the computer screens of all other participants through the server computer. Network vi-
6Although the experimental software allows for real time updating of actions, we voluntarily introduce
some latency in our experiment to avoid any possible confusion caused by some overload of activity on the
subjects’ screen. More precisely, the network depicted on any subject’s screen is updated every 5 seconds
or whenever the subject makes a decision.
15
sualization must be also correspondingly updated in real time. As the group size increases,
the total amount of information flows across the computer network increases drastically.
This can cause communication congestion and lagged responses. Another challenge with
such a large scale experiment is that it is constrained by the limited capacity of exist-
ing laboratories. Large groups that cannot fit into a single lab therefore require remote
interactions between subjects in different geographical locations (that is, different labs).
In order to handle both of these technical challenges, we use a Websocket protocol with
enhanced two-way communication between the server and subjects’ computers. It fits into
the environment of asychronous choices in real time and updating such information only
when necessary. Our Websocket technology relies on the Javascript run-time environment
Node.js. 7
Network information. In addition to the issue of network visualization, we are also
concerned about the network information each individual subject have access to. To get
a sense of the range of possibilities, consider two extreme scenarios: one, subjects only
observe their own neighbors in the current network, and two, subjects get to see the entire
network. The information and cognitive load implied by the latter scenario grows rapidly
in size of the group. In view of this potential trade-off between transparency of network
change and information and cognitive overload, we choose to inform each subject of a local
structure of the network within a (geodesic) distance 3 from the subject.
So given a fixed network, for every subject, we can partition the entire group of subjects
into two mutually exclusive subgroups: those who are located within distance 3 from the
subject, and those who are located outside this set. Figure 7 depicts an illustration of
network visualization and information shown in the experiment with 50 subjects. The left
side of Figure 7 shows the group of subjects within distance 3 (and all their links with
other subjects within distance 3). The right side of Figure 7 collects the group of subjects
further than distance 3 (with no information about their links in the network). In addition
to network information, subjects are informed about every subject’s effort—presented as
a number within the corresponding node along with that subject’s ID. The total access to
information of a node is captured by the size of that node.
Information on Payoffs. We now turn to information on payoffs: clearly subjects need
to be able to see their own payoffs in order to learn the profitability of different linking
7Since it only requires an internet connection and is compatible with most existing web browsers (e.g.,
Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer), this technology makes no specific restriction on the
physical location of every participant.
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Figure 7: Network information
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and effort options.8 What about information on payoffs of other individuals?
The literature of learning in games provides some guidance on this question (see, e.g.,
Camerer [2003] for a survey). In adaptive models such as reinforcement learning and
experience-weighted attraction learning (Camerer and Ho [1999]), players ignore informa-
tion on payoffs of other individuals. In other models such as imitation learning (Schlag
[1998]) and sophisticated learning (Camerer et al. [2002]), players would behave differently
if the payoffs of others are known. In the recent body of network experiments (e.g., Goeree
et al. [2009] and Falk and Kosfeld [2012]), researchers have tended not to show subjects the
payoffs of others. However, when information on others’ payoffs is available in particular in
large groups where it is difficult to infer such information, subjects may follow a different
behavioral rule. In fact, the experimental literature documents that human subjects may
behave differently when information on the payoffs of other individuals is available (e.g.,
Huck et al. [1999]).
Building on these strands of research, it is possible to argue that in games with small
groups of subjects, showing the payoffs of others may not be a first order issue, as subjects
can compute these payoffs themselves in a fairly straightforward manner, should the need
arise. However, in a dynamic game with a hundred subjects—and with the network and ef-
forts configuration constantly evolving—an individual may find it much harder to compute
the payoffs of other subjects. The knowledge of others’ payoffs may become an impor-
tant concern for experimental design for a couple of reasons. The first reason pertains to
learning dynamics: observing the others’ payoffs could potentially assist subjects in better
appreciating the trade-offs associated with different courses of action. The second reason
pertains to fairness considerations. The two equilibria described in Proposition 1 exhibit
very different levels of payoff inequality across players. The pure-influencer equilibrium ex-
hibits a minor payoff difference between the hub player and the spoke players, whereas the
pure-connector equilibrium yields a much larger payoff difference between the hub player
and the spokes players. These payoff differences may shape behavior of subjects. These
considerations motivate treatments in which we vary the level of information on others’
payoff.
In the baseline treatments subjects are shown their own payoffs but not the payoffs
of other subjects. A subject is also shown the efforts and access to information for all
other subjects, as shown in Figure 7. In principle, therefore, a subject can infer the gross
8Details about the costs and benefits are provided to the subjects to facilitate their comprehension of
their own payoff, as illustrated in Online Appendix D
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Figure 8: Screen shot of the Payoff Information Treatment
payoffs of any other subject by observing these pieces of information. But we believe
that such inference would be challenging for subjects during a large scale continuous-time
game, where the network and effort levels are evolving rapidly. In the payoff information
treatments, we add information about every player’s payoff through a set of color codes
as illustrated by Figure 8. More precisely, the border of each node in the network is
characterized by some color, which varies from green (high positive payoff) to red (high
negative payoff) depending on the player’s corresponding earnings. The scale of the color
code is constantly provided on the computer screen as in the left part of Figure 8.
3.2 Treatments and design details
The experiment varies the group size N ∈ {4, 8, 50, 100} and the visibility of others’ payoff.
Table 1 summarizes the 4 × 2 treatment structure of our experiment.
All the treatments are based on the same payoff function, as defined in equation (1).
Recall that the marginal cost of effort is set to c = 11. This implies an optimal effort of
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Group size
N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100
Others’ payoff
NO
Baseline4 Baseline8 Baseline50 Baseline100
information
YES
PayInfo4 PayInfo8 PayInfo50 PayInfo100
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
yˆ = 9 in the static model. The cost of linking is fixed to be k = 95. We restrict effort x as
any positive integer value not exceeding 20, i.e., x = 20. Finally, we set a1 = 1, a2 = 0.5,
and al = 0, for all l ≥ 3.
At any instant in the 6 minutes game, every subject can form or remove a link with
another subject by simply double-clicking on the corresponding node in the computer
screen. If the subject forms a link with another subject on the right side of the screen
(i.e., someone who is in more than 3 geodesic distance away), that subject along with his
neighbors and neighbors’ neighbors would be transferred to the left side of the computer
screen. In a case where the subject removes a link with another subject on the left side
of the screen, that subject would be transferred to the right side of the computer screen if
they become more than 3 geodesic distance apart in the network and would remain in the
left side of the screen otherwise.
During the experiment, each subject can also choose any level of effort by moving a
slider varying from 0 to 20 by increments of 1. This slider is provided on top of the decision
screen along with other payoff-relevant information including the subject’s gross earnings
(i.e., the benefit f(x) where x is the total amount of information the subject has access
to), cost of effort, cost of linking, and resulting earnings (i.e., payoff Πi(xg)). Further
information on the screen is provided in Online Appendix D.
3.3 Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted in the Laboratory for Research in Experimental and Be-
havioural Economics (LINEEX) at the University of Valencia and in the Laboratory for
Experimental Economics (LEE) at the University Jaume I of Castello´n . All the treat-
ments except for N = 100 treatments were conducted at the LINEEX. The experimental
sessions of N = 100 treatments were conducted through the internet connection between
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LINEEX and LEE (the number of subjects was then evenly distributed across both lo-
cations). Subjects in the experiment were recruited from online recruitment systems of
the two laboratories. Each subject participated in only one of the experimental sessions.
After subjects read the instructions, the instructions were read aloud by an experimenter
to guarantee that they all received the same information. While reading the instructions,
the subjects were provided with a step by step interactive tutorial which allowed them to
get familiarized with the experimental software and the game. Subjects interacted through
computer terminals and the experimental software was programmed using HTML, PHP,
Javascript, and SQL. Sample instructions and interactive tutorials are available in Online
Appendix C.
There were in total 18 sessions: 1 session of 16 subjects for each of the Baseline4
and PayInfo4 treatments, 1 sessions of 32 subjects for each of the Baseline8 and PayInfo8
treatments, 4 sessions of 50 subjects for each of the Baseline50 and PayInfo50 treatments,
and 3 sessions of 100 subjects for each of the Baseline100 and PayInfo100 treatments. In
each experimental session, subjects were (randomly) matched into a fixed group (if there
are more than one group in a session) and interacted with the same subjects throughout
the experiment. Therefore, there are 4 independent groups for each of the N = 4, N = 8,
and N = 50 treatments and 3 independent groups for each of the N = 100 treatments. A
total of 1096 subjects participated in the experiment.
The experiment consists of 6 rounds of the continuous-time game, each of which lasted
for 6 minutes with the first minute as a trial period and the subsequent 5 minutes as the
game with payment consequence. At the end of each round every subject was informed,
using the same computer screen, of a time moment randomly chosen for payment, detailed
information on subjects’ behavior at the chosen moment including a network structure and
all subjects’ efforts, and the resulting earning of the subject. While each group of people
was fixed in a session, subjects’ identification numbers were randomly reassigned at the
beginning of every round in order to reduce potential reputation effects. The first round
was a trial round with no payoff relevance and the subsequent 5 rounds were effective for
subjects’ earnings. In analyzing the data, we will focus on subjects’ behavior and group
outcomes from the last 5 rounds. At the beginning of the experiment, each subject was
endowed with an initial balance of 500 points and added positive earnings to or subtracted
negative earnings from that initial balance. Subjects’ total earnings in the experiment
amounted to the sum of earnings across the last 5 rounds and the initial endowment.
Earnings were calculated in terms of experimental points and then exchanged into euros
21
at the rate of 100 points being equal to 1 euro. Each session lasted on average 90 minutes,
and subjects earned on average about 18 euros, including a 5 euros show-up fee.
At the end of the experiment, subjects took incentivized tasks to elicit social preferences
and risk preferences. They are a modified version of Andreoni and Miller [2002] and Holt
and Laury [2002], respectively. In addition, subjects answered a brief version of the Big Five
personality inventory test adapted from Rammstedt and John [2007], a comprehension test
related to the experimental game, and a debriefing questionnaire including demographic
information. More details about them can be found in Online Appendix E.
3.4 Connecting theory and experiment
Our goal is to understand the principles that shape linking and assorted activity in large
groups. The static theory we have presented above predicts specialization in both linking
and effort. But there remain residual complications: for instance, there there are multiple
equilibria and these equilibria display considerable diversity in terms of efforts, linking, and
payoffs across individuals. Over and above this, in large groups, the individual decision
problem is complicated and it is far from clear if subjects will be able to navigate this
complexity. These considerations motivate a design with ample opportunity to experiment
and to learn. Given the large scale, we are then led naturally to an experimental design in
continuous time. This dynamic game in continuous time creates the possibility of signalling,
cheap talk, and reputation building; these forces go beyond the original static game. It
is therefore important to emphasize a more general methodological point: the aim is to
examine the economic implications of the trade-off between costs of linking and the costs of
personal efforts. The static model clarifies implications of these trade-offs for networks and
efforts. If these arguments are robust, then subjects should abide by the predictions of the
theory in an experimental setting that incorporates real world elements more accurately.
Keeping this in mind, for the purposes of the experiment, we take the following ‘high level’
view of the theory:
1. Law of the Few : a small fraction of individuals receive most of the links and carry
out most of the efforts. An increase in group size leads to greater specialization in
linking and efforts.
2. Strategic uncertainty : there exist multiple equilibria; these equilibria exhibit differ-
ences in actions, linking and payoffs across individuals.
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4 Results: Baseline Treatments
We highlighted the three key points from the snap shots in Figures 1 and 2: (i) extreme
specialization in linking and efforts; (ii) very large efforts and intense competition among
a few subjects to become the hub; and (iii) the emergence of pure influencer outcome. In
this section we examine the experimental data systematically. We start with a presentation
of the macroscopic outcomes. We will observe that there are interesting group size effects.
This motivates a study of individual level behavior and competition dynamics.
For simplicity in all the data analyses that follow, the data used from every round of
the game consists of 360 observations (snapshots of every subject’s choices in the group)
selected at regular time intervals of one second. Although some information about choice
dynamics between two time intervals may be lost, we consider the possible impact of such a
simplification as negligible to our analyses. Moreover, unless stated otherwise, all analyses
are focused on data from the last 5 minutes of each round of the game.
4.1 Macroscopic Patterns
For any individual, the indegree is the number of incoming links from other individuals.
Consider the Lorenz curve of indegrees at any point in time: it plots the cumulative fraction
of subjects, ranked from least connected to most connected, against the cumulative fraction
of total indegrees. Such Lorenz curves are then averaged across seconds of the last five
minutes, across rounds, and across groups in each treatment. Figure 9 presents these
average Lorenz curves and the corresponding Gini coefficients of indegree across different
group sizes. We observe that specialization in linking is present in every group size but
that it becomes more pronounced as the group size increases. This is clearly reflected in
the Gini coefficient: it is 0.61 for Baseline4, 0.70 for Baseline8, 0.86 for Baseline50, and
0.89 for Baseline100. By organizing the group-level average data, we conduct t-test for
the null hypothesis on the equality of Gini coefficients between a small group (N = 4 or
N = 8) and a large group (N = 50 and N = 100). We reject it with 5% significance level.
Next, we examine more closely the details of dynamics of specialization in linking. Two
simple statistics are the time fraction (number of seconds out of 5 minutes) in which the
individual is most connected and her mean indegree ratio. For the latter, we consider
each individual’s indegree and compute the sum of indegrees across individuals at every
second in the five minutes. We compute each individual’s indegree ratio defined as her
indegree divided by the sum of indegrees at every second. We then take the average of an
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Figure 9: Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients of indegrees
individual’s indegree ratio (across 5 minutes) to have her mean indegree ratio. With each
of these two variables, we compute its cumulative distribution in a round and consider the
average across rounds and groups.
Figure 10 shows the cumulative distributions of time fraction of being most connected
and mean indegree ratio. The fraction of subjects who never become the most connected
player are very high for the large group treatments—0.97 for Baseline100 and 0.93 for
Baseline50; this fraction is significantly lower for the smaller groups—0.31 for Baseline8
and 0.06 for Baseline4. It suggests that only a few subjects had any chance of being most
connected in the large group treatments, whereas most of the subjects in the small group
treatments experienced moments when they were most connected. Similarly, the fraction of
subjects whose mean indegree ratio is low increases significantly in group size. For instance,
relative frequencies of subjects with mean indegree ratio being less than or equal to 0.05
are 0.29 for Baseline4, 0.45 for Baseline8, 0.93 for Baseline50, and 0.97 for Baseline100.9
For each variable, the distribution for a small group treatment first order dominates the
distribution for a large group treatment at the usual significance level (p-value < 0.01 from
9This compares well with the predictions in the periphery sponsored star: the fraction of subjects with
0 mean indegree ratio would be 75% for N = 4, 88% for N = 8, 98% for N = 50, and 99% of the players
for N = 100.
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(a) Time fraction (b) Mean Indegree Ratio
Figure 10: Distributions of linking
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test)
We turn to examine the macroscopic features of efforts. We start again by drawing
the Lorenz curve for efforts and compute the Gini coefficient at every second of the five
minutes. We then average them across seconds of the game, across rounds, and across
groups. Figure 11 shows these average Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients, across different
group sizes. Specialization in efforts is present in every group size and it is more pronounced
in larger groups. This is reflected in the Gini coefficient of efforts: 0.48 for Baseline4, 0.58
for Baseline8, 0.75 for Baseline50, and 0.75 for Baseline100. The difference between Gini
coefficient in the small group treatment (N = 4 and N = 8) and that in the large group
treatment is statistically significant (p-values < 0.01 from t-test with the group-level data).
In order to look into the details of specialization in efforts in the continuous time
game, we consider a variable of mean effort ratio as we did for linking: an individual’s
effort ratio at every second is defined as her effort divided by the sum of efforts across
individuals at that second. We compute the mean of effort ratios across the five minutes
for each individual. With this variable, we compute its cumulative distribution in any
round and consider the average across rounds and groups. Specialization in efforts becomes
substantially more pronounced in large groups. The fraction of subjects whose mean effort
ratio is low increases significantly in group size. For instance, relative frequencies of subjects
with mean effort ratio being less than or equal to 0.05 are 0.19 for Baseline4, 0.42 for
Baseline8, 0.91 for Baseline50, and 0.99 for Baseline100. The distribution of mean effort
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Figure 11: Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients of Efforts
ratio for a small group treatment first order dominates that for a large group treatment at
the usual significance level (p-value < 0.01 from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
Result 1 Specialization in linking and efforts is present in all group sizes and becomes
significantly higher as group size increases.
Next, we turn to investigate the relation between indegrees, efforts and payoffs. Recall
from Proposition 1, that there are two equilibria, corresponding to the pure influencer
and the pure connector outcomes. In the former there is a positive correlation between
efforts and indegrees and a (weak) negative relation between indegrees and payoffs. By
contrast, in the latter equilibrium, there is a negative correlation between indegrees and
efforts, and a positive correlation between indegrees and payoffs. We run linear regression
analysis of mean indegree ratio on efforts and a median regression of (median) payoffs on
mean indegree ratio (with controlling demographic information, comprehension test score,
experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism, and Big 5 personality). We use the
median regression analysis to minimize the impact of outliers in payoffs. 10 Table 2 presents
10In Online Appendix F.1 we report the same regression analysis by replacing mean indegree ratio with
time fraction of being most connected. The regression results with both variables are quite similar.
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Figure 12: Distribution of Efforts
a set of regression results for each of the four baseline treatments. Robust standard errors,
clustered by individual subject, are reported in parenthesis.
This regression brings out the positive correlation between efforts and indegree: this
relation is statistically significant and positive in each of the baseline treatments. The
regression coefficients for efforts is smaller in the large group treatments than in the smaller
groups. This is partly because the range of effort is wider in the large group treatments
while the range of the time fraction of being most connected is similar across the treatments
as we will see in the next subsection. Next, we note that the association between indegree
and payoffs is weak and insignificant in both small group sizes, Baseline4 and Baseline8
treatments. There is, however, a strong negative and significant correlation between linking
and payoff in the large group sizes. A one percent increase in mean indegree ratio is
associated with 2.72 decrease in median payoff for the Baseline50 treatment and a 2.37
decrease in median payoff for the Baseline100 treatment. We summarize the group size
effects on the relation among effort, linking and payoff as follows.
Result 2 There is a positive correlation between effort and indegrees in all group sizes.
The correlation between indegrees and payoffs is insignificant in the small groups and
significantly negative in the large groups.
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Table 2: Regression analysis in the baseline treatments
Mean indegree ratio (%) Median payoff
N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100 N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100
Effort 5.10*** 3.67*** 0.89*** 0.44***
(0.33) (0.55) (0.12) (0.07)
Mean Indegree 0.05 0.03 -2.72*** -2.37*
ratio (%) (0.17) (0.12) (0.38) (1.31)
Number of
observations 80 160 1000 1500 80 160 1000 1500
R-squared 0.769 0.508 0.407 0.210 0.117 0.089 0.145 0.090
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, age,
female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism, and Big
5 personality.
4.2 Individual Behavior and Competition Dynamics
This section seeks to understand the macroscopic patterns observed—especially the effects
of the group size—by examining individual behaviour. The snap shots in Figures 1 and 2
suggest that there are different types of subjects with distinct dynamics of efforts during
the game—the two most connected subjects who are competing with each other and the
rest of the subjects.
We start with an examination of the dynamics of efforts made by the three different
types of subjects identified at every second of the experiment—most connected, 2nd most
connected, and the others. Figure 13 presents the average time series of effort for each of
the group sizes. The end of the trial minute is represented by the vertical dotted line. We
observe very sharp increase in effort by the most connected individual as we move from
group size 8 to 50. The other interesting feature of the data is the relative levels of effort
between the top two connected individuals: in the small groups there is a persistent gap
between their efforts; in the large groups there is a very small gap in effort levels between
the top two connected individuals. On the other hand, the average level of effort made
by the others is low in all group sizes and steadily decreases over time. These time series
patterns suggest that an increase in group size leads to much greater competition to become
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(a) Baseline4 (b) Baseline8
(c) Baseline50 (d) Baseline100
Figure 13: Time series of efforts for the three different types of subjects
a hub.
We next look at the dynamics of median payoffs obtained by the three different types
of subjects in Figure 14. The two most connected subjects do not perform better than the
other subjects in the large groups. In particular, the 2nd most connected subjects in both
Baseline50 and Baseline100 obtain persistently lower payoffs over time than those of the
other subjects. This is a consequence of the high efforts. The most connected subjects in
the Baseline50 also get persistently lower payoffs than the other subjects except for the
last 10 seconds. In the Baseline100, they earn as much as the others for brief periods but
the average payoffs are lower than others’ payoffs. By contrast, in small groups, the payoffs
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(a) Baseline4 (b) Baseline8
(c) Baseline50 (d) Baseline100
Figure 14: Time series of median payoffs for the three different types of subjects
earned are stable and very similar among the three different types of subjects.
In order to make a statistical assessment on the treatment effects on subjects’ behavior,
we conduct linear regression analyses of mean efforts and oudegree (the number of links)
made by each type of subjects—most connected, 2nd most connected, and the others—on
the dummy of large groups (N = 50 or 100). In this analysis, we define the types of subjects
with the ranking of the fraction of time (across the five minutes) in which a subject is most
connected in a round.11 The most connected individual is the subject who receives the
11Figure 21 in Online Appendix F.2 presents histograms showing the time fraction of different efforts over
5 minutes for the three different types of subjects across group sizes in the baseline treatment. The two
most connected subjects in the large groups chose the maximum effort level, 20, for the majority of time,
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most links for the largest fraction of time. The 2nd most connected individual is similarly
defined. We refer to the rest of subjects as the ‘others’.
Table 3 reports the regression results after controlling for round dummies, demographic
information, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism,
and personality. Robust standard errors clustered by individual subject are reported.
Average efforts and outdegrees for each type of subjects in the small groups (N = 4 and
8) are also reported for comparison.
We observe statistically significant and large treatment effect on efforts and outdegree.
The most connected subject chose 68% more effort and about one link more in the large
groups as compared to the small groups. The 2nd most connected subject made 173%
more effort in the large groups than in the small groups. These patterns confirm that
competition is more intense in the large groups.12
The scale effect on subjects’ behavior have large effects on payoffs. Table 4 reports me-
dian regression results on the effects of scale on individual median payoffs.13 As expected,
the two most connected subjects earned substantially less in the large groups than in the
small groups: 27% less for the most connected subject, albeit less strongly significant, and
55% less for the 2nd most connected subject. 14 And thanks to the intense competition of
the two most connected subjects, the other subjects earned 44% more in the large groups
than in the small groups.
We now summarize the findings on individual behavior, the competition dynamics, and
payoffs.
Result 3 An increase in group size intensifies the competition between the two most
connected subjects. It leads to a significant increase in efforts and outdegree and
results in a decline of their payoffs in large groups, relative to the other subjects.
whereas they in the small groups chose significantly less with the mode of the most connected subject’s
effort being around the equilibrium effort level, 9
12Tables 9 and 10 in Online Appendix F.1 report the replications of Table 3 by splitting the two large
groups. The results remain similar with each of the large groups.
13Due to outliers of payoffs, we conduct median regression analysis with median payoffs.
14Tables 11 and 12 in Online Appendix F.1 report the replications of Table 4 by splitting the two large
groups. The negative effects of large group on median payoffs for the two most connected subjects are
stronger in N = 50 than in N = 100.
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Table 3: Scale effects on effort and outdegree in the baseline treatments
Mean effort Mean outdegree
most 2nd most others most 2nd most others
connected connected connected connected
Large group 6.00*** 9.04*** 0.62* 1.03*** 0.75* 0.24***
(1.05) (1.10) (0.32) (0.35) (0.40) (0.05)
Average in
small group 8.77 5.24 2.65 0.20 0.62 0.90
Number of
observations 75 75 2590 75 75 2590
R-squared 0.59 0.64 0.04 0.38 0.41 0.03
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round
dummies, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and
altruism, and Big 5 personality.
Table 4: Scale effects on payoffs in the baseline treatments
Median payoff
most 2nd most others
connected connected
Large group -23.75* -44.94** 37.12***
(13.25) (18.13) (2.90)
Median in
small group 86.50 81.00 85.00
Number of
observations 75 75 2590
R-squared 0.19 0.23 0.08
Notes: Robust standard errors are report in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round dummies, age, female, education,
comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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5 Payoff Information
We found that, as the group size grows, individuals compete fiercely to become hubs. This
leads them to invest very large amounts and, as a result, their earnings suffer. Indeed, in
some cases the hubs actually make negative earnings!15 This is a striking and unexpected
outcome. In this section we examine the sources of these negative earnings. An obvious
concern is that the game becomes very complex with the increased number of players and so
individuals may not understand the payoff implications of different choices. To explore this
line of thought we consider a design in which subjects are shown the payoffs of everyone.
This section investigates the effects of information of others’ payoffs on subjects’ behavior
and outcomes and its interaction with the scale effects.
5.1 Macroscopic Patterns
Figure 15 begins by presenting the average of Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients of indegree
across seconds of the last five minutes of the game, across rounds, and across groups in the
payoff information treatment. We again observe the aggregate effect of scale on indegree
distribution in the payoff information treatment, albeit to a lesser degree compared to
the baseline treatments. The Gini coefficients are larger in the large group sizes than
in the small group sizes: 61% for PayInfo4, 77% for PayInfo8, 84% for PayInfo50, and
81% for PayInfo100. Comparing these statistics from the baseline treatments, we observe
an increase of Gini coefficient in PayInfo8 relative to Baseline8 and a decrease of this in
PayInfo100 relative to Baseline100. In spite of this, we observe a statistical difference
in this measure of specialization of linking between PayInfo4 and each of PayInfo50 and
PayInfo100 (p-value < 0.01 from t-test with the group-level average data). These scale
effects are also seen in the cumulative distributions of the time fraction of being most
connected and mean indegree ratio (see Online Appendix F.2).
Next, we turn to examine the macroscopic patterns of efforts in the payoff information
treatments. Figure 16 presents the average of Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients of efforts,
across the last five minutes of the game, across rounds, and across groups. The scale effects
we see are similar to what we observed for the baseline treatment. The Gini coefficient
increases in group size: 38% for PayInfo4, 57% for PayInfo8, 74% for PayInfo50, and
15We observe that 25% (13%) of the 1st most connected subject’s sample in the Baseline50 (Baseline100)
earned negative earnings. There is no incidence of negative earnings for the most connected subject in the
small group treatments. Negative earnings are often made by excessive efforts and multiple links.
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Figure 15: Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients of indegrees: Payoff Information treatments
74% for PayInfo100. We observe a statistical difference in this measure of specialization of
efforts between PayInfo4 and each of PayInfo50 and PayInfo100 (p-value < 0.01 from t-test
with the group-level average data) and between PayInfo8 and PayInfo50 (p-value < 0.04).
We also observe similar scale effects with the cumulative distributions of mean effort ratio
(see Online Appendix F.2).
Next, we turn to the relation between efforts and linking and the relation between
linking and payoff in the payoff information treatments. As in the baseline treatments in
Section 4.1, we run linear regression analysis of mean indegree ratio on efforts, and median
regression analysis of median payoffs on mean indegree ratio with the same set of control
variables. Table 5 presents a set of regression results for each of the four payoff informa-
tion treatments. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in
parenthesis.
Firstly, starting with the regression results in the large group payoff information treat-
ments, we find that the relation between efforts and linking is significant but relatively
weak. On the other hand, the relation between linking and payoff in the large group
treatments is strongly positive. Overall we interpret that showing information on others’
payoff makes subjects choose efforts cautiously and leads to the relation between linking
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Figure 16: Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients of Efforts: Payoff Information treatment
Table 5: Regression analysis when information on others’ payoff is observable
Mean indegree ratio (%) Median payoff
N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100 N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100
Effort 6.68*** 4.80*** 0.40*** 0.23***
(0.52) (0.61) (0.09) (0.06)
Mean indegree ratio 0.45*** 0.10 1.81*** 4.43***
(0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.62)
Number of
observations 80 160 1000 1500 80 160 1000 1500
R-squared 0.726 0.540 0.064 0.055 0.551 0.070 0.078 0.002
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of interaction between individual subject and round,
are report in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
All regressions include a constant, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures
of risk aversion and altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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and payoff which is predicted by the pure-connector equilibrium.
We next look at the regression results in the small group payoff information treatments.
As in the baseline treatments, we find a strong and positive association between efforts and
linking in the small group payoff information treatment. This pattern is in line with the
corresponding prediction of the pure-influencer equilibrium. When we analyze the relation
between linking and payoff, we observe a weak and insignificant relation between linking
and payoff in the PayInfo8 treatment, which is in line with that of the pure-influencer
equilibrium. We observe a significant but weaker relation between linking and payoff in
the PayInfo4 treatment.
These observations are summarized as follows.
Result 4 (i) Specialization in linking and efforts continues to hold in the payoff informa-
tion treatments. (ii) In the small groups, the correlation between linking and effort
is strongly positive, while the correlation between linking and payoff is weak. (iii) In
the large groups there is a strongly positive correlation between linking and payoffs,
while the correlation between efforts and linking is weak.
A comparison of this result with Result 2 under the baseline treatment reveals that
payoff information has strong treatment effects. Specifically, we note that the negative
correlation between indegrees and payoffs is reversed and now there is a positive correlation
between indegrees and payoffs. This change support the view that subjects tend to make
more cautious choices and move away from a pure influencer outcome towards a pure
connector outcome. We now examine the individual level data to understand better how
this comes about.
5.2 Individual Behavior and Competition Dynamics
As before, we seek to understand the macroscopic patterns in terms of individual choices
on efforts and links. We start with Figure 17 that presents the time series of average
efforts (the end of the trial minute is represented by the vertical dotted line) for the three
different types of subjects identified at every second in each of the group sizes. Compared
to Figure 13 in the baseline treatments, we observe that competition dynamics in the large
group payoff information treatments is quite different: the time series of efforts made by
two most connected subjects are substantially lower when information on others’ payoffs
is visible. By contrast, in the small groups, the dynamics of efforts is similar across the
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(a) PayInfo4 (b) PayInfo8
(c) PayInfo50 (d) PayInfo100
Figure 17: Time series of efforts in the payoff information treatment
payoff information treatment and the baseline. The behavior of ‘other’ subjects is similar
across the two information treatment and across different group sizes.
Figure 18 presents time series of median payoffs for the three types of subjects in the
payoff information treatment. We would like to compare this figure with Figure 14 that
summarizes the outcomes in the baseline treatments: this comparison reveals that there is a
sharp increase in the payoffs of the most connected subjects in the large groups. In the small
groups, the payoffs are similar across the two information treatments. Putting together
the observations from Figure 17 and Figure 18, we are led to conclude that the availability
of information on others’ payoffs leads to lower efforts by the two most connected subjects
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(a) PayInfo4 (b) PayInfo8
(c) PayInfo50 (d) PayInfo100
Figure 18: Time series of median payoffs in the payoff information treatment
and this in turn creates large payoff gains for them.
We next conduct linear regression analyses of mean efforts and outdegree made by each
type of subjects on the dummies of payoff information and large group (N = 50 or 100)
and their interaction dummy. As was done in Table 3, we define each type using the time
fraction of being most connected in the 5 minutes.16
16Figure 22 in Online Appendix F presents histograms showing the time fraction of different efforts over
5 minutes for the three different types of subjects across group sizes in the payoff information treatment.
We observe a drastic change of efforts in the large groups: in the payoff information treatments, the two
most connected subjects substantially lower their level of efforts and the unique mode of the distribution
is at zero effort. On the other hand, we observe little change of efforts in the small group sizes by showing
information on others’ payoffs.
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Table 6 report the regression results with controlling for round dummies, demographic
information, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism,
and personality. Average efforts and outdegrees for each type of subjects in the large groups
(N = 50 or 100) baseline treatment are also reported for comparison. The coefficient of the
interaction dummy captures the difference-in-differences effect for the treatments of large
group and payoff information. On the other hand, the coefficient of the payoff information
describes the payoff information effect in the small groups.
In large groups, we observe a significantly negative effect of payoff information on efforts.
Compared to the corresponding subject type in the large group baseline treatments, the
most connected subject makes 61% less effort and the 2nd most connected subject makes
68% less effort. The rest of subjects also made 28% less effort in the large group payoff
information treatments.17 Hence, all the subjects in the large groups lowered their efforts
when information on others’ payoffs is available. In contrast, in the small groups, subjects’
efforts did not respond to the availability of information on others’ payoffs.
We then proceed to check the effect of payoff information on subjects’ payoffs. Table
7 reports the median regression results of payoffs on the dummies of payoff information
and large group as well as their interaction with the same set of control variables as in
Table 6. We observe substantial impacts of payoff information on subjects’ earnings in the
large groups. The median payoffs increase by 202% and 260%, respectively, for the most
connected subject and the 2nd most connected subject. In contrast, we observe a 11%
drop of the payoffs for the other subjects.18
Result 5 (i). In the small groups, subjects do not change efforts and linking behavior
significantly in response to the availability of information on others’ subjects. (ii).
In the large groups, the two most connected individuals make substantially lower
efforts in the payoff information treatment as compared to the baseline treatment.
This results in large payoff gains for them.
We are led to the view that when groups are large, it is difficult for a subject to keep
track of the payoff implications of different choices. Where information on payoffs of others
17Tables 14 and 15 in Online Appendix F.1 replicate Table 6 by considering N = 50 and N = 100
separately. The negative effect of payoff information remain similar in each case.
18Tables 16 and 17 in Online Appendix F.1 report the replication of Table 7 by considering the cases
of N = 50 and N = 100 separately. The results remain overall similar although the negative effect of
payoff information for the most connected subject in N = 100 is only about 61% increase and imprecised
estimated.
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Table 6: Treatment effects on effort and outdegree
Mean effort Mean outdegree
most 2nd most others most 2nd most others
connected connected connected connected
Payoff info -0.75 0.52 0.00 -0.05 0.24 0.05
(0.77) (0.70) (0.36) (0.84) (0.18) (0.07)
Large group 6.30*** 8.41*** 0.62** 1.14 0.94*** 0.25***
(1.04) (1.19) (0.30) (0.93) (0.33) (0.05)
Payoff info × Large group -9.24*** -9.00*** -0.91** 2.34 -0.80** -0.01
(1.41) (1.63) (0.39) (2.42) (0.39) (0.07)
Average in
large group baseline 15.12 13.22 3.22 1.90 1.32 1.12
Number of
observations 150 150 5180 150 150 5180
R-squared 0.53 0.51 0.05 0.43 0.34 0.04
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round
dummies, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and
altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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Table 7: Treatment effects on payoffs
Median payoff
most 2nd most others
connected connected
Payoff info 6.71 -12.75*** -10.56***
(11.54) (4.53) (1.97)
Large group -30.33* -42.76** 36.20***
(17.08) (17.34) (1.90)
Payoff info × Large group 119.24*** 120.76*** -14.07***
(29.18) (29.02) (2.30)
Median in
large group baseline 59.00 47.00 126.50
Number of
observations 150 150 5180
R-squared 0.09 0.17 0.09
Notes: Robust standard errors are report in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round dummies, age, female, education,
comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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is not directly shown, some subjects are willing to make large efforts in order to attract
links from others. In doing so, these subjects appear not to understand that these large
efforts lead to much lower payoffs. However, when information on others’ payoffs is made
directly observable, individuals become more cautious in their effort decisions. By contrast,
in small groups, it seems that subjects are able to keep track of the payoff implications of
their effort more accurately and the impact of showing information on everyone’s payoffs
has relatively small impact on subjects’ effort behavior.
6 Conclusion
There is a large body of research that describes the structure of large empirical networks.
This work highlights the richness of the structures. By contrast, the economic theory of
network formation emphasizes the emergence of highly stylized structures—such as the
star network. This apparent difference has hampered the welfare analysis of networks.
Moreover, experimental tests of the theory have tended to reject the exact predictions on
network structure. This creates a gap between the growing empirical literature and the
theory of networks.
In this paper our aim has been to bridge this gap. To this end, we conduct large scale
experiments on network formation. The design of the experiments builds on a model of
linking and efforts taken from Galeotti and Goyal [2010]. The principal insight of the
theory is that individual choices leads to a law of the few. The distinctive feature of our
experiments is that we allow for up to 100 subjects to make choices in continuous time under
laboratory conditions. The paper presents a new experimental platform that integrates a
network visualization tool (that uses the Barnes-Hut approximation algorithm (Barnes and
Hut [1986])) with an interactive tool of dynamic asynchronous choices.
Our experiments provide strong support for macroscopic predictions of the theory:
there is specialization in linking and efforts across all treatments. Moreover, and in line
with the theory, the specialization is more pronounced in larger groups. Thus subjects
abide by the law of the few.
Information on payoffs provided to subjects affects their behavior and yields interesting
welfare consequences. In the treatment where subjects see only their own payoffs, in large
groups, the most connected individuals compete fiercely—they exert large efforts and have
small earnings. By contrast, when a subject sees everyone’s payoffs, in large groups, the
most connected individuals engage in less intense competition—they exert little effort and
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have large earnings. The effects of payoff information are much more muted in small
groups. This leads us to the view that when groups are large, cognitive constraints become
a factor. As a result, some subjects are willing to make large efforts in order to attract
links from others, even though such high efforts may result in lower earnings.
References
J. Andreoni and J. Miller. Giving according to garp: An experimental test of the consis-
tency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica, 70(2):737–753, 2002.
V. Bala and S. Goyal. A non-cooperative model of network formation. Econometrica, 68
(5):1181–1231, 2000.
A.-L. Baraba´si and R. Albert. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science, 286
(5439):509–512, 1999.
J. Barnes and P. Hut. A hierarchical o(n log n) force-calculation algorithm. Nature, 324:
446–449, 1986.
S. K. Berninghaus, K.-M. Ehrhart, and M. Ott. A network experiment in continuous time:
The influence of link costs. Experimental Economics, 9(3):237–251, 2006.
A. G. Bramoulle, Y. and B. Rogers. Oxford Handbook on Economics of Networks. Oxford
University Press, 2016.
E. Calford and R. Oprea. Continuity, inertia, and strategic uncertainty: A test of the
theory of continuous time games. Econometrica, 85:915–935, 2017.
S. Callander and C. Plott. Principles of network development and evolution: An experi-
mental study. Journal of Public Economics, 89:1469–1495, 2005.
C. Camerer. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton
University Press, 2003.
C. Camerer and T. H. Ho. Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games.
Econometrica, 67:827–874, 1999.
43
C. Camerer, T. H. Ho, and J.-K. Chong. Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction
learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory, 104:
137–188, 2002.
A. Falk and M. Kosfeld. Its all about connections: Evidence on network formation. Review
of Network Economics, 11:Article 2, 2012.
D. Friedman and R. Aprea. A continuous dilemma. American Economic Review, 102(1):
337–63, 2012.
A. Galeotti and S. Goyal. The law of the few. The American Economic Review, 100(4):
1468–1492, 2010.
J. K. Goeree, A. Riedl, and A. Ule. In search of stars: Network formation among hetero-
geneous agents. Games and Economic Behavior, 67(2):445–466, 2009.
S. Goyal, J. Moraga, and M. van der Leij. Economics: an emerging small world? Journal
of Political Economy, 114(2):403–412, 2006.
S. Goyal, S. Rosenkranz, U. Weitzel, and V. Buskens. Information acquisition and exchange
in social networks. Economic Journal, 127:2302–2331, 2017.
C. A. Holt and S. K. Laury. Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic
Review, 92(5):1644–1655, 2002.
S. Huck, H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler. Learning in cournot oligopoly-an experiment.
Economic Journal, 109:C80–C95, 1999.
M. Jackson and A. Wolinsky. A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal
of Economic Theory, 71:44–74, 1996.
M. O. Jackson and B. W. Rogers. Meeting strangers and friends of friends: How random
are social networks? American Economic Review, 97(3):890–915, 2007.
M. Kearns, S. Judd, and Y. Vorobeychik. Behavioral experiments on a network formation
game. ACM EC 2012, 2012.
J. Pettit, D. Friedman, C. Kephart, and R. Oprea. Software for continous game experi-
ments. Experimental Economics, 17:631–648, 2014.
44
B. Rammstedt and O. P. John. Measuring personality in one minute or less: A 10-item
short version of the big five inventory in english and german. Journal of research in
Personality, 41(1):203–212, 2007.
A. Riedl, I. M. Rohde, and M. Strobel. Efficient coordination in weakest-link games. The
Review of Economic Studies, 83(2):737–767, 2016.
R. Rong and D. Houser. Emergent star networks with ex ante homogeneous agents. 2012.
K. Schlag. Why imitate, nd if so, how? a bounded rational approach to multi-armed
bandits. Journal of Economic Theory, 78:130–156, 1998.
B. van Leeuwen, T. Offerman, and A. Schram. Continuity, inertia, and strategic uncer-
tainty: A test of the theory of continuous time games. Forthcoming to Journal of the
European Economic Association, 2018.
45
ONLINE APPENDICES
A Theory
The following proposition shows that, under discrete values of personal effort, a sufficiently
high cost of linking implies a pure influencer equilibrium (for any group size n) and an
approximate pure connector equilibrium (for a sufficiently large group size).
Proposition 2. Suppose payoffs are given by (1), a1 = 1, a2 ∈ (0, 1), yˆ ∈ X = {0, 1, 2, . . . , x},
and c(yˆ + a2 − 1) < k < cyˆ.
(a) Every Nash equilibrium s∗ = (x∗, g∗) is such that g∗ is a periphery sponsored star
structure where the hub is a pure influencer investing yˆ and every spoke invests 0.
(b) If n ≥ 2 + yˆ−1a2 , there exist pure connector -equilibria where the hub invests 0 while
m spokes invest 1 and others invest 0 (with m s.t. (m− 1)a2 < yˆ ≤ 1 + (m− 1)a2).
Proof. It follows from Proposition 1 that the pure influencer equilibrium always hold,
regardless of n. Moreover, the pure connector equilibrium holds only if n ≥ 2 + ka2(cyˆ−k) , in
which case it requires every spoke to personally invest yˆ1+(n−2)a2 . Since c(yˆ + a2 − 1) < k
implies yˆ < kc +1, we have that n ≥ 2+ ka2(cyˆ−k) > 2+
yˆ−1
a2
, and consequently yˆ1+(n−2)a2 < 1
for any n ≥ 2 + yˆ−1a2 . However, since the lowest positive effort that can be made in the
game is 1, no more than m = yˆ−1a2 + 2 players (with m < n) can benefit from making such
minimum positive effort. In this case, each of those positive investors accesses (m − 1)a2
from forming a link and therefore earns f(1 + (m− 1)a2)− c−k, which is strictly less than
if they unilaterally deviate by forming no link and investing yˆ since c(yˆ + a2 − 1) < k can
be rewritten as (m−1)a2 < kc . As a result, the pure connector outcome is an -equilibrium
whenever  > f(yˆ)− f(1 + (m−1)a2)− c(yˆ−1) where m is the number of investing spokes
such that (m− 1)a2 < yˆ ≤ 1 + (m− 1)a2.
B Network visualization
The experimental software uses the well known Barnes-Hut approximation algorithm as
introduced by Barnes and Hut [1986], which provides a low complexity simulation technique
to compute the forces applied to any node as influenced by every other node in a network.
Such forces are computed through three distinct sources:
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• All other nodes from the network: all nodes apply a repulsion force Fr to each other
to avoid overlaps and allow a sparse visualization of the network. This force is the
only used by Barnes and Hut [1986].
• Connected nodes (with direct links only) in the network: nodes that are linked with
each other apply attractive forces Fs towards each other to allow for visual proximity
of connected nodes.
• Point of origin O: nodes are applied a gravitational force Fcg to a center of origin to
pull the entire network towards the center of the screen. In particular, such a force
allows disconnected components to be within reasonable distance from each other,
and therefore more easily visualized on the screen.
In summary, nodes are attracted by gravity and other nodes they are linked with, and
repulsed by other nodes they are not directly linked with.
The Barnes-Hut algorithm consists in first constructing a quad-tree by recursively di-
viding the visual space into same size groups such that every node can eventually be
associated with exactly one group based on its visual position (leaf of the tree). Any such
group may however associate several nodes such that the aggregated forces applied from
those nodes can be approximated through a unique force (as if the group of nodes were a
single node). More precisely, starting from the largest group of the Barnes-Hut quad-tree
(the root), the algorithm assesses the distance between a given o and the center of mass
of that group of nodes: if the distance is sufficiently large (according to a given exogenous
threshold), then the group of nodes is considered as a single node, else the process is iter-
ated by considering subgroups from the tree (nodes sufficiently close to o will therefore be
considered independently). Such approximation is known to considerably reduce computa-
tional complexity for computing forces applied to every node. The root of the Barnes-Hut
quad-tree represents the whole visual space.
More formally, we define the distance between a node o and a node m (or group of
nodes represented as a single node m) as dist(o,m). The repulsion force applied to node o
by m is determined as
Fr(o,m) =
Kg.Mm
dist(o,m)3
(3)
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Where Kg captures the gravitational constant such that Kg < 0 to obtain the repulsion
effect. In Equations (3), it is assumed that the mass of every node is 1. However, the
mass Mm may be larger when representing a group of nodes (Mm represents the number of
nodes in that group, as described by the Barnes-Hut algorithm). Similarly, the attraction
force applied to node o by m corresponds to
Fs(o,m) =
Ks
dist(o,m)
.

0 if o and m are not linked
(L− dist(o,m)) if o forms a link with m
(dist(o,m)− L) if m forms a link with o
(4)
Where L defines the resting length of an edge, and Ks the spring gravity constant such
that Ks > 0 to obtain the attraction effect. Note from Equation (4) that the force applied
on two linked nodes is symmetric, i.e., both nodes are equally attracted by each other.
Finally, we define the central gravity force applied to node o as
Fcg(o) =
Kcg
dist(o,O)
(5)
Where O represents the position of the point of origin, and Kcg the central gravity
constant such that Kcg > 0 to obtain the attraction effect.
The net force vector applied to any node o resulting from the above three forces is then:
Fx(o) = dx(o,O).Fcg(o) +
∑
m∈N\{o}
dx(o,m).(Fr(o,m) + Fs(o,m)) (6)
Fy(o) = dy(o,O).Fcg(o) +
∑
m∈N\{o}
dy(o,m).(Fr(o,m) + Fs(o,m)) (7)
The above static properties describe the net forces that are applied in the network, given
the positions of all nodes and the links between nodes. The resulting dynamic update of the
network is achieved by computing the corresponding velocity of nodes on both coordinate
axes. More precisely, the velocity applied to a node o at a time t on both coordinate axes
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(x and y) is determined as follows:
Vx(o, t) = max(Vmax, (Fx(o)−D.Vx(o, t− 1)).T + Vx(o, t− 1)) (8)
Vy(o, t) = max(Vmax, (Fy(o)−D.Vy(o, t− 1)).T + Vy(o, t− 1)) (9)
Where D represents the damping factor determining how much of the velocity from the
previous physics simulation iteration carries over to the next iteration, T the time step for
the discrete simulation, and Vmax the maximum velocity of nodes (used to increase time
to stabilization). We assume no initial velocity, i.e., Vx(o, 0) = Vy(o, 0) = 0. Given such
velocity, the position update of a node o at any time t directly follows:
x(o, t) = x(o, t− 1) + Vx(o, t).T (10)
y(o, t) = y(o, t− 1) + Vy(o, t).T (11)
The discrete simulation terminates and node o stabilizes whenever the associated veloc-
ity (on both coordinate axes) becomes sufficiently low with respect to some given threshold
(Vmin). More precisely, the convergence rules are:
Vx(o, t) < Vmin (12)
Vy(o, t) < Vmin (13)
Model parameter setting used in the experiment:
• Kg = −2000
• Ks = 0.04
• Kcg = 0.3
• L = 95
• D = 0.09
• T = 0.5
• Vmin = 0.3
• Vmax = 10
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C Experimental instructions
[In the following instructions, N is to be replaced with any value from {3, 7, 49, 99} depend-
ing on the treatment]
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions are the same
for all the participants. The instructions state everything you need to know in order to
participate in the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of
the experimenters will answer your question.
You can earn money by earning points during the experiment. The number of points
that you earn depends on your own choices and the choices of other participants. At the
end of the experiment, the total number of points that you have earned will be exchanged
at the following exchange rate:
100 points = 1 Euro
The money you earn will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. The other
participants will not see how much you earned.
Details of the experiment
The experiment consists of 6 (six) independent rounds of the same form. The first
round is for practice and does not count for your payment. The next 5 rounds will be
counted for your payment.
At the beginning of each round, you will be grouped with N other participants. This
group will remain fixed throughout the 6 rounds. Each of the participants will be randomly
assigned an identification number of the form “Px” where x is a number between 1 and N.
Those numbers will be randomly changed across every round of the experiment. The actual
identity of the participants will not be revealed to you during or after the experiment. The
participants will always be represented as blue circles on the decision screen. You are
always represented as a yellow circle identified as “ME”.
Each round will last 6 (six) mins: the first minute will be a trial period, only
the latter 5 minutes will be relevant for the earnings. Your earnings in a given
round will be based on everyone’s choice at a randomly selected moment in the last
5 mins of the round. In other words, any decision made before or after that randomly
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chosen moment will not be used to determine your points. This precise moment will
be announced to everyone only at the end of the round, along with the corresponding
behaviour and earnings.
At the beginning of the experiment, you are given an initial balance of 500 points.
Your final earnings at the end of the experiment will consist of the sum of points you earn
across the 5 last rounds plus this initial capital (the first round will be used to familiarize
yourself with the game and will have no influence on your earnings). Note that if your final
earnings (i.e., the sum of your earnings across the 5 last rounds plus the initial endowment)
go below 0, your final earnings will be simply treated as 0.
In each round, every participant will have choose two types of actions:
• How many any units to buy/invest: You may buy at most 20 units. Each unit
costs you 11 points.
• Add/delete links with other participants: You are linked with another person
if you form a link with that person or that person forms a link with you (or both).
You do not pay any fee for links formed by others. The people that you are linked
with (regardless of whether you or they form the links) are called your neighbours.
You automatically have access to all units bought by your neighbours as well
as half of the units bought by your neighbours’ neighbours (see below for an
example). Each link you form costs you 95 points.
You may revise your choices at any moment before the round ends. During a round, you
will also be informed about every other participant’s most recent decision (units bought
and formed links), which will be updated every 5 seconds or whenever you change your
own choice.
At any moment, the total number of units you have access to (i.e., units you bought +
units bought by your neighbours + units bought by your neighbours’ neighbours) generates
points for you according to the following figure (for example, accessing 4 units generates
100 points, as shown by the dotted lines):
Moreover, having access to 20+m units generates 216+m points.
The computer screen will be split into two parts:
• The middle side of the screen presents you and your local neighbourhood.
More precisely, you will see your neighbours, the neighbours of your neighbours,
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and the neighbours of neighbours’ neighbours. In other words, you will see the
participants that are up to 3 links away from you.
• The right side of the screen presents participants outside of your local
neighbourhood.
• The left side of the screen presents the code for the players’ net earn-
ings in the network. [Payoff information treatment only] The inner circle of each
node from the middle or right part side of the screen is characterized by some color,
which varies from green (high positive net payoff) to red (high negative net payoff)
depending on the player’s corresponding net earnings.
Each node is described by their identification number “Px” and the number of units
that they buy. Identification numbers “Px” are randomly assigned in every round. There-
fore, every player is likely to have a different ID in different rounds. In the initial state of
the network, nobody buys any unit and no link is formed.
Tutorial
Please follow this simple tutorial simulating a simple virtual scenario on the computer
screen. In this tutorial you are interacting with 9 other players. In the initial state, you
are not linked with anyone and you do not buy any units: you start at 0 points.
1. The slider allows you to choose how many units you wish to buy yourself. For
example, buying 4 units costs you 44 points (= 4 units × 11 points, in red on the
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screen) and generates 100 points (according to the figure from the previous page, in
green on the screen).
2. Initially, the nodes on the right side of the screen represent all other players (in this
simulation, those players are not real people). The size of node reflects the total
number of units bought by that node and the units accessed via the network. For
example, P1-P4 are the largest nodes because these players have access to the most
units.
3. You may choose to form a link with any player by simply double clicking on the
corresponding node. For example, forming a link with P4 reveals that P1, P2, and
P3 each form a link with P4, and P9 forms a link with P1. Forming a link with P4
costs you 95 points (in red on the screen), but it also gives you access to 8.5 units (7
from P4 + 0.5 × 1 from P1 + 0.5 × 1 from P2 + 0.5 × 1 from P3), which generates
174 points (according to the above figure, describing the benefit function in green on
the screen). If you do not buy any additional unit yourself, your resulting net payoff
is 79 points (= 174 points − 1 link × 95 points).
4. After forming a link with P4, you observe that some nodes remain unobserved (P5,
P6, P7, and P8 on the right side). However, forming an additional link with P9 (by
double clicking on the corresponding node) reveals that those nodes all form a link
with P9. You were not allowed to observe them before because they were 4 nodes
away from you (for example, P5 were connected to you via P4, P1, and P9). You can
now observe them because they are only 2 nodes away from you (for example, P5 is
connected to you via P9 only). Remember that you can only see players that are at
most 3 nodes away. Assuming you still do not buy any unit yourself, your resulting
net payoff is 16 points (= 206 points from accessing 12.5 units − 2 links ×
95 points).
5. Alternatively, you may choose to remove a link that you previously formed by double
clicking on the corresponding node. For example, after forming links with P4 and P9,
removing the link with P4 leads to players P2 and P3 becoming unobserved again,
as they are now more than 3 nodes away from you.
6. Note that varying the amount of units you buy directly affects the sizes of the nodes
you are linked with as well as their neighbours. Indeed, the amount of units they
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each have access to includes the units you buy (the larger this amount, the larger the
node).
7. You may also shape the visual structure of the network by dragging nodes as it pleases
you.
Summary
Here is a brief description of information available on the decision screen:
1. The timer indicates elapsed time since the beginning of the round. Any round lasts
6 mins. A moment will be randomly selected in the last 5 mins to determine
everyone’s payoff. The time displayed will turn red when entering this interval.
2. Only decisions made at the randomly selected moment in the round matter
to directly determine the earnings. The payoff may be negative at the end of a round.
However, starting from a balance of 500 pts, any negative total of points at the end
of the 5 rounds will be equivalent to 0 point.
3. The amount of units you have access is equal to the sum of (1) the units bought by
you, (2) the units bought by your neighbours, and (3) half of the units bought by
your neighbours’ neighbours.
4. You are represented as the yellow node, and your ID is “ME”.
5. Every other node’s ID is represented as “Px” (inside the node) where x is a number.
Every node has a unique ID, which is randomly reassigned in every round.
6. The size of each node determines how many units that node has access to (units
bought personally plus units accessed from others, directly and indirectly).
7. The amount of units bought personally by a player is mentioned inside the corre-
sponding node.
8. [Payoff information treatment only] The color of each node determines that node’s
net earnings according to the code depicted on the left side of the screen.
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D Network game interface
The decision making interface used in the experiment is similar across all treatments. More
specifically, Figure 19 illustrates a (fictitious) example of a subject’s computer screen in
Treatment Baseline100. The top part of the screen depicts information about the timer
indicating how much time has lapsed in the current round (the timer turns red when
payoffs become effective, i.e., after more than 1 minute), the subject’s own effort, which
can be modified via the slider, and a comprehensive description of the subject’s own payoff.
Information about payoffs include gross earnings (output of function f(.)), the cost of effort
(own effort multiplied by c), the cost of linking (number of links multiplied by k), and the
net earnings (costs substracted from gross earnings). The bottom part of the screen shows
detailed information about the network (the subject’s node is highlighted in yellow): the
subject’s local network is represented on the left, other players outside of the subject’s
local network are found on the right. Note that a scrolldown feature is available for the
subject to explore every player outside of his/her local network. Baseline treatments with
smaller group sizes use the very same interface (the scrolldown feature is not available then
because all players are then directly visible on the screen).
Similarly, Figure 20 illustrates a (fictitious) example of a subject’s computer screen
in Treatment PayInfo100. The only difference with the decision screen from Figure 19
is about the wider range of colors used to represent the border of each node depicted in
the network. Any given node’s color is directly associated with that node’s corresponding
payoff, according to the scale presented on the left part of the screen. payoff-information
treatments with smaller group sizes use the very same interface.
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Figure 19: Example of decision screen for Treatment Baseline100
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Figure 20: Example of decision screen for Treatment PayInfo100
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E Questionnaires
At the end of the experiment, subjects answered a set of surveys aiming at measuring
various types of individual differences. More precisely, incentivized measures of compre-
hension in network game, social preferences, and risk preferences were used. Finally non
incentivized personality measures were used before which subjects filled up a debriefing
questionnaire that includes demographics information.
E.1 Comprehension check
In order to assess the subjects’ comprehension of the network game played during the
experiment, we provided 5 questions, each of which with a unique correct answer. Each
correct answer was rewarded with 0.1 euro for the subject.
The following first 2 questions were used across all treatments (correct answers are “11
pts” to question 1, and “95 pts” to question 2).
The third question depicted below was used in the payoff information treatment with
n = 50 (the correct answer is “P36”). This question was adapted in all other treatments
by matching the number of nodes to the group size in the experiment, and by removing
the colors in the baseline treatments.
The following questions 4 and 5 below were also used in the payoff information treatment
with n = 50 (correct answers are “P1” for both questions 4 and 5). These questions were
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however adapted only in other treatments where n > 4 by again matching the number
of nodes to the group size in the experiment. The reason for filtering the small group
treatments (with n = 4) is that the limited number of nodes did not allow representing
the corresponding scenarios. As before, these questions were also adapted to the baseline
treatments by simply removing the colors to match the design of the actual game that
subjects played.
59
E.2 Social preferences
The social preferences measure was adapted from Andreoni and Miller [2002] and involved
a series of five money allocation tasks between the decision maker and some anonymous
external participants of another experiment at the LINEEX lab (corresponding payments
were therefore made to these external passive participants). The five tasks used in our
experiment were represented through sliders as shown in the following figure:
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Note however that each question was presented in a different screen, and the order
of presentation was randomized for every subject. Furthermore, 50 points were worth 1
euro both the subject, and the other anonymous external participant. Detailed instructions
provided to the subjects, as well as a screenshot highlighting one of the above five questions
are described below.
Instructions: You are asked to answer a series of 5 questions, each of which consists of
selecting an allocation of points that you most prefer between yourself and an anonymous
randomly selected person who is participating to a different experiment in this lab. At
the end of the study, we will randomly select your allocation for 1 of the 5 questions to
determine the payments for both you and the other person in this part. Your decisions will
remain unknown to the other persons you are matched with.
E.3 Risk preferences
The risk preference measure was adapted from Holt and Laury [2002] and consisted of a
series of five binary choices between lotteries, presented as in the figure below.
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E.4 Personality test
Non incentivized measures were used through a simplified version of the Big Five person-
ality inventory test adapted from Rammstedt and John [2007], as shown below.
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F Appendix tables and figures
F.1 Regression tables
F.2 Appendix figures
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Table 8: Regression analysis in the baseline treatments: time fraction
Time fraction of being most connected (%) Median payoff
N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100 N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100
Effort 5.53*** 4.66*** 1.27*** 0.55***
(0.40) (0.65) (0.23) (0.12)
Time fraction 0.04 0.03 -1.29*** -0.28
(0.13) (0.10) (0.26) (0.79)
Number of
observations 80 160 1000 1500 80 160 1000 1500
R-squared 0.729 0.516 0.265 0.115 0.119 0.090 0.127 0.055
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions includes a constant, age,
female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism, and Big
5 personality.
Table 9: Scale effects on effort and outdegree in the baseline treatments
Mean effort Mean outdegree
most 2nd most others most 2nd most others
connected connected connected connected
N = 50 6.61*** 7.27*** 0.32 0.99*** 0.74 0.15***
(1.08) (1.41) (0.32) (0.28) (0.52) (0.06)
Average in
small group 8.77 5.24 2.65 0.20 0.62 0.90
Number of
observations 60 60 1120 60 60 1120
R-squared 0.61 0.59 0.04 0.49 0.47 0.04
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round
dummies, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and
altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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Table 10: Scale effects on effort and outdegree in the baseline treatments
Mean effort Mean outdegree
most 2nd most others most 2nd most others
connected connected connected connected
N = 100 6.64*** 11.06*** 0.88*** 2.03** 0.72* 0.30***
(1.54) (1.10) (0.32) (0.77) (0.38) (0.05)
Average in
small group 8.77 5.24 2.65 0.20 0.62 0.90
Number of
observations 55 55 1630 55 55 1630
R-squared 0.62 0.83 0.04 0.53 0.46 0.06
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round
dummies, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and
altruism, and Big 5 personality.
Table 11: Scale effects on payoffs in the baseline treatments
Median payoff
most 2nd most others
connected connected
N = 50 -40.81*** -51.09** 28.82***
(10.20) (23.61) (1.73)
Median in
small group 86.50 81.00 85.00
Number of
observations 60 60 1120
R-squared 0.39 0.23 0.11
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round
dummies, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and
altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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Table 12: Scale effects on payoffs in the baseline treatments
Median payoff
most 2nd most others
connected connected
N = 100 16.54 -25.41* 53.20***
(29.95) (14.54) (2.77)
Median in
small group 86.50 81.00 85.00
Number of
observations 55 55 1630
R-squared 0.20 0.38 0.14
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round
dummies, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and
altruism, and Big 5 personality.
Table 13: Regression analysis when information on others’ payoff is observable: time frac-
tion
Time fraction of being most connected (%) Median payoff
N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100 N = 4 N = 8 N = 50 N = 100
Effort 7.75*** 5.55*** 0.49** 0.34*
(0.68) (0.84) (0.21) (0.20)
Time fraction 0.35** 0.10 1.13*** 1.74***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.31) (0.25)
Number of
observations 80 160 1000 1500 80 160 1000 1500
R-squared 0.714 0.479 0.042 0.022 0.546 0.113 0.051 0.002
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions includes a constant, age,
female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism, and Big
5 personality.
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Table 14: Treatment effects on effort and outdegree
Mean effort Mean outdegree
most 2nd most others most 2nd most others
connected connected connected connected
Payoff info -1.35* 0.21 -0.04 0.74* 0.29* 0.05
(0.76) (0.65) (0.37) (0.45) (0.17) (0.07)
N = 50 6.53*** 6.48*** 0.30 1.48*** 0.95** 0.17***
(1.21) (1.37) (0.33) (0.36) (0.44) (0.06)
Payoff info × N = 50 -8.90*** -5.72*** -0.39 -0.29 0.00 -0.10
(1.83) (1.93) (0.44) (0.57) (0.54) (0.08)
Average in
Baseline50 15.70 11.33 2.84 1.18 1.28 1.04
Number of
observations 120 120 2240 120 120 2240
R-squared 0.54 0.38 0.04 0.43 0.41 0.07
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round
dummies, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and
altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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Table 15: Treatment effects on effort and outdegree
Mean effort Mean outdegree
most 2nd most others most 2nd most others
connected connected connected connected
Payoff info -0.55 0.20 0.06 -0.57 0.02 0.03
(0.79) (0.70) (0.36) (0.89) (0.12) (0.07)
N = 100 6.53*** 10.26*** 0.87*** 0.75 0.86** 0.30***
(1.33) (1.48) (0.32) (1.94) (0.34) (0.06)
Payoff info × N = 100 -9.82*** -12.48*** -1.28*** 2.30 -0.89** -0.01
(1.65) (2.01) (0.41) (2.47) (0.37) (0.08)
Average in
Baseline100 14.35 15.73 3.48 2.86 1.40 1.17
Number of
observations 110 110 3260 110 110 3260
R-squared 0.53 0.68 0.07 0.54 0.32 0.04
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are report in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round
dummies, age, female, education, comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and
altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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Table 16: Treatment effects on payoffs
Median payoff
most 2nd most others
connected connected
Payoff info 0.76 -18.73*** -6.07**
(8.94) (4.04) (2.38)
N = 50 -57.53*** -48.79** 29.99***
(11.82) (19.15) (2.46)
Payoff info × N = 50 142.27*** 100.25*** -14.96***
(18.28) (29.02) (2.26)
Median in
Baseline50 48.50 51.00 118.00
Number of
observations 120 120 2240
R-squared 0.21 0.14 0.11
Notes: Robust standard errors are report in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round dummies, age, female, education,
comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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Table 17: Treatment effects on payoffs
Median payoff
most 2nd most others
connected connected
Payoff info -0.64 -15.63*** -11.36***
(12.59) (5.31) (2.05)
N = 100 40.61** -43.22 51.44***
(17.34) (27.99) (1.85)
Payoff info × N = 100 92.09 160.98*** -20.70***
(150.87) (29.02) (2.67)
Median in
Baseline100 153.00 42.50 140.50
Number of
observations 110 110 3260
R-squared 0.07 0.26 0.13
Notes: Robust standard errors are report in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant, round dummies, age, female, education,
comprehension test score, experimental measures of risk aversion and altruism, and Big 5 personality.
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(a) the 1st most connected
(b) the 2nd most connected
(c) the others
Figure 21: Distribution of efforts in the baseline treatment
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(a) the 1st most connected
(b) the 2nd most connected
(c) the others
Figure 22: Distribution of efforts in the payoff information treatment
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(a) Time fraction (b) Mean indegree ratio
Figure 23: Distribution of linking: information on others’ payoff
Figure 24: Distribution of Efforts in the payoff information treatments
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